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Abstract-  Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) is a rapidly-
growing Internet service for telephone communication. 
However, while it offers a number of cost advantages over 
traditional telephone service, it can pose a security threat, 
especially when used over public networks. In the absence of 
sufficient security, users of public networks are open to threats 
such as identity theft, man-in-the-middle attack, interception of 
messages/eavesdropping, DOS attacks, interruption of service 
and spam. S/MIME adds security to the message itself and 
can be used to provide end-to-end security to SIP. S/MIME 
can also offer confidentiality or integrity, or both, but it does 
not provide any anti-replay protection. However, we propose 
to use a unified architecture for the implementation of security 
protocols in the form of a security toolbox system. It will 
prevent an attack against anti-replay. 
Keywords:  S/MIME, SIP, IPSec, replay attack, SDP. 
I. Introduction 
ow can a client be sure that his message will not 
be intercepted by someone? This is the most 
important and urgent question that security 
professionals have to answer when dealing with VoIP 
systems. 
Voice over Internet Protocol is a rapidly growing 
Internet service. Voice over IP (VoIP) has been 
developed in order to provide access to voice 
communication anywhere in the world. VoIP is simply 
the transmission of voice conversations over IP-based 
networks. Although IP was originally planned for data 
networking, now it is also commonly used for voice 
networking. While VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) 
offers a number of cost advantages over traditional 
telephoning, it can also pose a security threat. So 
watertight security is needed when using VoIP, end-to-
end, especially when used on a public network. There is, 
however, no standard for VoIP and no general solution 
for VoIP security. The security of VoIP systems today is 
often non-existent or, in the best case, weak. As a result, 
hackers can easily hack.  
II. Review 
Several writers have taken on this or similar 
problems. Gupta  and  Shmatikov  [1]   investigated  the  
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security of the VoIP protocol stack, as well as SIP, SDP, 
ZRTP, MIKEY, SDES, and SRTP. Their investigation 
found a number of flaws and opportunity for replay 
attacks in SDES that could completely smash content 
protection. They showed that a man-in-the-middle attack 
was possible using ZRTP. They also found a weakness 
in the key derivation process used in MIKEY.   
Niccolini et al. [2] designed an intrusion 
prevention system architecture for use with SIP. They 
evaluated the effectiveness of legitimate SIP traffic in the 
presence of increasing volumes of malformed SIP 
INVITE messages in an attack scenario. 
Fessi et al. [3] proposed extensions to P2P SIP 
and developed a signaling protocol for P2P SIP that 
uses two different Kademlia-based overlay networks for 
storing information and forwarding traffic. Their system 
requires a centralised authentication server, which 
provides verifiable identities at the application/SIP layer.  
Palmieri and Fiore [4] describe an adaptation of 
SIP to provide end-to-end security using digital 
signatures and efficient encryption mechanisms. The 
authors developed a prototype implementation and 
conducted a performance analysis of their scheme. 
However, one weakness of this system is that it is open 
to man-in-the-middle attacks.  
Syed Abdul and Mueed Mohd Salman [5] 
developed Android driven security in SIP based VoIP 
systems using ZRTP on GPRS network. It 
communicated securely, using the GPRS data channel 
encrypted by using ZRTP technique. As it relies on 
ZRTP, it is probably vulnerable to man-in-the-middle 
attacks too.  
Chirag Thaker, Nirali Soni and Pratik Patel [6] 
developed a new Performance Analysis and Security 
Provisions for VoIP Servers. This paper provided a 
performance analysis of VoIP-based servers providing 
services like IPPBX, IVR, Voice-Mail, MOH, Video Call 
and also considered the security provisions for securing 
VoIP servers. 
III.
 
    Related work
 
This paper considers a different solution, 
presenting a structure to assure end-to-end security by 
using the key management protocol S/MIME with the 
security toolbox system. S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose 
Internet Mail Extensions) is a standard for public key 
encryption and signing of MIME data. S/MIME provides 
H 
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end-to-end integrity, confidentiality protection and does 
not require the intermediate proxies to be trusted. 
However, S/MIME does not provide any anti-replay 
protection. To protect against a replay attack, we use 
the security toolbox system. Toolbox system is a 
protocol as a single package comprised of two layers: 
control and a library of algorithms.
 
IV.
 
Parameters’ of a Solution
 
  
 
SIP is an application-layer protocol 
standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), and is designed to support the setup of 
bidirectional communication sessions for VoIP calls. The 
main SIP entities are endpoints (softphones or physical 
devices), a proxy server, a registrar, a redirect server, 
and a location server.
 
However, TLS (Transport Layer Security) can be 
used to introduce integrity and confidentiality to SIP 
between two points. Although it uses SIP signaling to 
secure, it has some limitations. Each proxy needs the 
SIP header in clear text to be able to route the message 
properly. All proxies in use in a connection must be 
trusted, as messages are decrypted and encrypted in
each node. There will be no assurance that an SIP 
message cannot be intercepted by someone in the 
network.
 
IPSec can also be used to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, data origin authentication and 
even replay protection to SIP. It cannot be used in end-
to end security. Proxy servers need to read from SIP 
headers and sometimes write to them. It can be used in 
protecting data flows between a pair of hosts (host-to-
host), between a pair of security gateways (network-to-
network), or between a security gateway and a host 
(network-to-host). IPSec assumes, however, that a pre-
established trust relationship has been introduced 
between the communicating parties, making it most 
suited for SIP hosts in a VPN scenario. Further, the SIP 
specification does not describe how IPSec should be 
used; neither does it describe how key management 
should be operated. 
 
S/MIME is a set of specifications for securing 
electronic mail and can also be used to secure other 
applications such as SIP. S/MIME provides security 
services such as authentication, non-repudiation of 
origin, message integrity, and message privacy. Other 
security services include signed receipts, security labels, 
secure mailing lists, and an extended method of 
identifying the signer’s certificate(s) etc.
 
S/MIME provides open, interoperable protocols 
that allow compliant software to exchange messages 
that are protected with digital signatures and encryption. 
S/MIME requires that each sender and recipient have an 
X.509-format digital certificate, so public-key 
infrastructure (PKI) design and deployment is a major 
part of S/MIME deployment.
 
The same mechanisms can be applied for SIP. 
The MIME security mechanism is referred to as S/MIME 
and is specified in RFC 2633. S/MIME adds security to 
the message itself and can be used to provide end-to-
end security to SIP. 
 
Suppose two clients are trying to communicate 
each other. One client wants to send a message to the 
other client.
 
Figure 1 :
 
shows how to send the message in secure way.
  Before S/MIME can be used to encrypt the 
message, one needs to obtain a key/certificate, either 
from one's in-house certificate authority (CA) or from a 
public CA. 
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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The client uses S/MIME to sign and/or encrypt a 
SIP message. S/MIME combines public-key and secret-
key cryptography. To encrypt the message, the sender 
obtains certificates from the certificate authority (CA) 
and generates a strong, random secret key. The 
message is then signed with the private key
 
of the 
sender. 
 
The encryption of the message is a bit trickier. It 
requires that the public key of the recipient is known to 
the sender. This key must be fetched in advance or be 
fetched from some kind of central repository. The secret 
key is used to encrypt the message, and then the public 
key of the recipient is used to encrypt the key for the 
recipient. When the recipient gets the message, he uses 
the private key to decrypt his copy of the secret key, and 
the secret key is used to decrypt the original message.
 
V.
  
The Security
 
Risk   
S/MIME does not provide any anti-replay 
protection. The most serious attack is a replay attack on 
SDES, which causes SRTP to repeat the key stream 
used for media encryption, thus completely breaking 
transport-layer security. To protect against a replay 
attack, we use the security toolbox. How to use it to 
prevent an attack on SRTP, when used in combination 
with an SDES key exchange, is described below.
 
Suppose two users, Alice and Bob are trying to 
communicate with each other. Bob is the initiator in this 
session, and SDES is used to transport SRTP key 
material. To provide confidentiality for the SDES 
message, S/MIME is used to encrypt the payload. 
 
S/MIME does not provide any anti-replay 
protection. Suppose an attacker, Charles, is trying to 
attack the call. Charles sends the copy of Bob’s original 
INVITE message to Alice, containing an S/MIME-
encrypted SDP attachment, with the SDES key transfer 
message. Since Alice does not maintain any state for 
SDP, she will not be able to detect the replay. Charles 
will effectively, for Alice, become Bob!
 
This is why it is proposed to use security 
toolbox: to prevent such a personation attack. Since 
anti-replay tools will be maintained all states for SDP, at 
all times, all messages will be filtered through anti-replay 
tools. Anti-replay tools will be able to detect the replay. 
S/MIME provides the security at the document level and 
IPSec performs the same function at the packet level. 
This configuration should become common whenever 
an application uses S/MIME as a document-level 
protection. 
 
VI. A Security Toolbox    
Ibrahim S. Abdullah and Daniel A. Menasce [9] 
designed a security toolbox. In the toolbox, every tool 
carries out a specific function such as: encryption, 
decryption, random number generation, integrity 
protection, anti-replay, and header processing. 
 
Figure 2 :
 
Components of A Toolbox System
 
Figure 2 shows the major components of such 
a toolbox. The template is a set of specifications that 
define the required security services. The template 
database takes the necessary steps from the database 
for overall protection 
 
The toolbox architecture consists of two parts: 
one that must be secured as part of the trusted domain 
of the operating system (CBT) and another that may be 
part of the user domain. 
 
 
The secure part consists of the following 
components: 
 
1.
 
Databases:
 
store information about different 
operations of the toolbox, such as: private and 
secret keys, templates, registry for the tools and 
template names, alert messages, authorization 
information, policies, and the toolbox configuration 
information.
 
2.
 
Interpretation engine:
 
interprets protocol templates. 
 
3.
 
Security tools:
 
the set of tools that implement the 
security algorithms.
 
4.
 
Cache:  stores temporary keys and associated 
information.
 
5.
 
Inter-communication manager:
 
handles control 
messages between toolboxes running at different 
hosts (e.g., during handshake). 
 
The second part of the toolbox consists of: 
 
1.
 
Template developer and analyser:
 
analyses 
template creation, verification, and maintenance. 
 
2.
 
Certificate repository:
 
contains copies of the 
certificates that the toolbox consults for 
authentication. These certificates may be placed in 
public storage, because they are protected by their 
creator’s digital signature. This repository could part 
of a directory service application. 
 
3.
 
Directory services are standard applications used to 
provide user’s authentication and authorization 
services. 
 
Now let us revisit our friends Alice and Bob with 
a security toolbox. Recall that Bob accepts Alice’s 
INVITE message. They communicate but then Charles 
sends replay messages to Alice, pretending to be Bob. 
Now the security toolbox takes action. First, the toolbox, 
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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to copy Bob’s messages and send them as if he were 
Bob, the toolbox sees that Charles’ IP Packet is not the 
same as Bob’s. Therefore, Charles is recognized as a 
personator and his packets are denied access to Alice.  
Charles’ scheme fails and he goes away with nothing. 
Alice and Bob continue to communicate happily without 
any interference from hackers like Charles.
 
VII.
 
Conclusion 
S/MIME is being increasingly used as at 
security system for VoIP messages. However, S/MIME 
has an Achilles heel. The Achilles heel is the replay 
attack. This happens because S/MIME does not identify 
the source of the messages coming into the system. 
This article suggests a solution to this problem by 
combining the S/MIME with a security toolbox, using 
IPSec to monitor IP packet. The toolbox monitors the IP 
packet of message originators and, where a new IP 
address enters from the same source, denies access to 
the message. Such a solution guarantees complete 
end-to-end user security for VoIP messages at minimal 
cost. Thus S/MIME, with this solution, maximizes 
effectiveness, given the technology of the moment, in 
protecting the user.
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working with IPSec, has full identification of Bob: 
especially including his IP Packets. When Charles starts 
